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D&O LIABILITY FOR ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS 
Barak Orbach* 
This Article provides a guide for liability of directors and officers 
(“D&O”) for antitrust violations.  
Where violations of law appear profitable, a misalignment of 
compensation schemes and formal compliance policies may preserve 
incentives to engage in misconduct. In such situations, the likelihood and 
prevalence of misconduct heavily depend on the effectiveness of the 
company’s oversight system. Antitrust violations intend to increase 
profit, are hard to detect, and are hard to prove. The perceived 
profitability of antitrust violations, thus, sometimes motivates D&O to 
participate in, encourage, or ignore such violations.  
I review the liability standards that may apply to D&O for antitrust 
violations, as well as trends in relevant doctrines and enforcement 
policies. I explain the reasons for the growing risk of personal liability 
and argue that this risk is likely to continue rising in the foreseeable 
future. Specifically, today, D&O may be held liable for failures to make 
good faith efforts to develop and maintain organizational culture of 
compliance with antitrust law. I outline factors that D&O and their 
counsels should consider.  
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the defining characteristics of the past decade is the 
changing public attitudes toward large corporations and their 
executives.1 Since the Great Recession (2007-2009), public pressures to 
increase scrutiny of large business and hold executives accountable for 
corporate wrongdoing have been mounting. While this trend has been 
particularly conspicuous during the past decade, it began in the early 
1990s. This Article examines an important aspect of the trend: personal 
liability of directors and officers (“D&O”) for antitrust violations. The 
central question that I explore is whether D&O may be held accountable 
for creating, preserving, or neglecting an organizational culture that 
motivates antitrust violations. I find that D&O already face an increased 
risk of such liability and that this risk is likely to continue growing. 
My inquiry focuses on a common pattern of antitrust violations in 
large companies: agents of the company make decisions and take actions 
that constitute steps in the progress of an antitrust violation, believing 
that their actions serve the company for their perceived profitability even 
though the company’s policies expressly prohibit conduct that may 
violate the antitrust laws.2 In this scenario, (1) standing alone, the 
 
 1. See, e.g., ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES 
WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS (2018) (criticizing the permissiveness of enforcement policies 
toward businesses and their managers); BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW 
PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS (2014) (same); A Mammoth Guilt Trip, 
ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 2014, at 21 (summarizing the changing attitudes). 
 2. All agents are fiduciaries but not all fiduciaries are agents. Specifically, corporate 
directors are fiduciaries although they are not agents. See Hill v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields 
Inc., 790 F.2d 817, 824 (10th Cir. 1986) (stating that “all agents are fiduciaries with respect 
to matters within the scope of their agency.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Mgmt. 
Techs., Inc. v. Morris, 961 F. Supp. 640, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“directors are not agents of 
the corporation and have no authority as directors to act on its behalf.”); Young v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 790 F.2d 567, 573 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that “directors are not acting as 
agents in their management of the corporation, but as fiduciaries”); Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. 
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individual decisions and actions may be lawful; (2) the violations are 
potentially profitable; (3) perceived contributions of agents and other 
fiduciaries to profit are rewarded; (4) the company’s policies strictly 
prohibit conduct that violates antitrust law; and (5) the board of directors 
and senior management are not aware of specific violations. In such 
circumstances, the concern is that the company’s compliance policies 
are formalities intending to shield D&O from liability for antitrust 
violations that they incentivize indirectly. 
Most alleged antitrust violations are analyzed under review 
standards that do not draw bright lines between lawful and unlawful 
conduct, resulting in some uncertainty about the legality of practices and 
agreements. The rule of reason is the paradigmatic example of such 
standards.3 Under corporate law, however, uncertainty about the legality 
of actions does not absolve D&O of their obligations to evaluate legal 
risks.4 To the contrary, to meet their fiduciary responsibilities, D&O 
must make good faith efforts to detect, evaluate, and address material 
legal risks.5 Similarly, federal securities law requires disclosure of 
material risks, including uncertainty about potential legal liabilities.6 
To illustrate, consider “reverse-payment settlements” that used to 
be very common in the pharmaceutical industry. These settlements, also 
known as “pay-for-delay settlement agreements,” resolve patent disputes 
between brand-name drug companies and generic drug companies. 
Under the terms of the settlement agreements, the brand-name drug 
company pays the generic drug company to delay entry of generic 
versions of its brand-name drug. In 2013, the Supreme Court held that 
the legality of reverse-payment settlements should be evaluated under 
the rule of reason.7 Does the ambiguity of the rule of reason relieve 
pharmaceutical executives of the duty to evaluate material legal risks 
associated with individual reverse-payment settlements? No. A positive 
answer to this question would give companies a license to enter into 
agreements between competitors to avoid or delay competition. 
Consider now a more generic situation—the acquisition of company A 
by company B. Do B’s D&O who participate in the negotiation and 
 
Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 539–40 (Del. 1996) (“Directors, in the ordinary course of their 
service as directors, do not act as agents of the corporation. . . . An agent acts under the control 
of the principal. . . . A board of directors, in fulfilling its fiduciary duty, controls the 
corporation, not vice versa.”). See generally Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 
795, 795 (1983) (“Fiduciaries appear in a variety of forms, including agents, partners, directors 
and officers, trustees, executors and administrators, receivers, bailees, and guardians.”). 
 3. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FL. L. REV. 81 (2018). 
 4. See infra Section IV.A. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See infra Section IV.C. 
 7. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 159-60 (2013). 
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approval of the transaction have a duty to make good faith efforts to 
evaluate potential liabilities for past antitrust violations of A? Yes. 
Antitrust liabilities may have a material effect on the value of A.  
I. Principles 
A. D&O Liability 
D&O liability may be imposed for direct involvement in corporate 
wrongdoing or for failures to evaluate legal risks. It is not imposed for 
poor business decisions.8 
Direct Involvement in Corporate Wrongdoing. Liability for direct 
involvement in corporate wrongdoing concerns situations where a 
person participated in, directed, or authorized violations of law. Strictly 
speaking, this form of personal liability is not for corporate wrongdoing 
but for the person’s involvement in wrongdoing. For example, agents 
who coordinate a price-fixing scheme may be held criminally liable for 
their participation in unlawful conspiracy.9 Likewise, an executive, who 
directs subordinates to conceal and destroy evidence relevant to an 
antitrust investigation, may be held liable for obstruction of justice.10  
The Yates Memorandum, enforcement guidelines that the Justice 
Department (“DOJ”) issued in 2015, formalized the growing emphasis 
on personal accountability for direct involvement in corporate 
wrongdoing.11 The Yates Memorandum, however, recognizes that in 
large corporations, “responsibility can be diffuse and decisions are made 
at various levels,” while “high-level executives” are “insulated from the 
day-to-day activity in which the misconduct occurs.”12 For these 
organizational attributes, it is often difficult to determine the culpability 
of individuals, especially senior executives.13 The Yates Memorandum’s 
 
 8. See infra Section IV.D. 
 9. See, e.g., United States v. VandeBrake, 679 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2012); United States 
v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 10.  See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Former Coach USA Inc. Executive 
Sentenced to 15 Months in Prison for Obstruction of Justice (March 23, 2017). 
 11. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Memorandum of the Deputy Attorney General on 
Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Yates 
Memorandum]; Brent Snyder, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Individual Accountability for Antitrust Crimes, Remarks at the Yale Global Antitrust 
Enforcement Conference (February 19, 2016); Gideon Mark, The Yates Memorandum and 
Cartel Enforcement, 51 UC DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 95 (2018). See also Bill Baer, Ass’t Att’y 
Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Justice, Prosecuting Antitrust Crimes, Remarks as Prepared for 
the Georgetown University Law Center Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium at 8 (Sept. 
10, 2014) (“It is hard to imagine how companies can foster a corporate culture of compliance 
if they still employ individuals in positions . . . who have refused to accept responsibility for 
their crimes and who the companies know to be culpable.”). 
 12. Yates Memorandum, id., at 2. 
 13. Id. 
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principles were incorporated into the Justice Manual, which contains the 
major DOJ policies and procedures pertaining to the investigation, 
litigation, and prosecution of violations of federal law.14 The 2018 
Justice Manual states that “imposition of individual criminal liability 
may provide the strongest deterrent against future corporate 
wrongdoing,” because “a corporation can act only through 
individuals.”15 Accordingly, the Manual instructs that the prosecution of 
corporate crimes must focus on “wrongdoing by individuals” and, 
specifically, “high-level corporate officers.”16 
Oversight Failures. Personal liability for failures to evaluate legal 
risks concerns situations where D&O efforts to detect, prevent, or report 
about corporate wrongdoing were inadequate.17 Direct involvement in 
corporate wrongdoing is not a necessary condition for oversight liability. 
Courts often say that oversight liability is “possibly the most difficult 
theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a 
judgment.”18 Be that as it may, oversight liability is also a critically 
important legal theory. Oversight liability risks incentivize compliance 
with applicable laws and regulations.  
In large companies, however, a misalignment of compensation 
schemes and oversight systems sometimes results in incentives to 
engage in seemingly profitable violations of law, while organizational 
complexities insulate D&O from knowledge about improper conduct.19 
Over the past three decades, oversight responsibilities have become 
a central feature of federal enforcement policies.20 The 1991 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines created “incentives for 
organizations to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, 
and reporting criminal conduct.”21 Two years later, the Antitrust 
Division introduced the leniency program, which provides that, under 
certain conditions, the first cartel member to report about the cartel to 
 
 14. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL (Sept. 2018). 
 15. Id. § 9-28.210. 
 16. Id. §§ 9-28.010, 9-28.210. 
 17. See infra Section IV.A. 
 18. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). See 
also Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 820 n.99 (Del. 2019) (citing Caremark); In re 
Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (same); In re Am. 
Int’l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 799 (Del. Ch. 2009) (same); Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 
908, 939 (Del. Ch. 2007) (same); In re Verisign, Inc., Derivative Litig., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 
1195 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (same); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 372 (Del. 2006) (same); 
Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003) (same); McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 817 
(6th Cir. 2001) (same). 
 19. See infra Section II.B. 
 20. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 14, § 9-28.800; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 8B2.1 (Nov. 2018). 
 21. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 8, introductory cmt. 
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the DOJ may receive immunity.22 For the increased risk of liability and 
prospects of immunity, the leniency program created powerful 
incentives to implement antitrust compliance programs, or revise 
existing ones.23 In the wake of the accounting scandals of the early 
2000s, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to improve the 
auditing of public companies.24 SOX and its regulations require public 
companies to maintain effective internal controls, CEOs and CFOs of 
public companies to certify the accuracy of financial statements filed 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and lawyers for 
public companies to report internally material violations of law by their 
company. More recently, in 2017, the DOJ released guidance to 
prosecutors on how to assess corporate compliance programs.25 This 
policy rewards companies that have effective oversight systems, thereby 
incentivizing companies to harden their oversight systems. In July 2019, 
the DOJ’s Antitrust Division issued a policy that applies the same 
principles to antitrust enforcement.26 Under this policy, federal 
prosecutors may weigh the existence and effectiveness of a corporate 
compliance program at both the charging and sentencing 
recommendation stages. Specifically, the policy states: 
An effective compliance program will promote an organizational 
culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to 
compliance with the law. . . . Support of the program from the 
company’s top management is critical to the success of an antitrust 
compliance program. The Division has recognized that if senior 
management does not actively support and cultivate a culture of 
compliance, a company will have a paper compliance program, not 
an effective one.27 
 
 22. See CHRISTINE A. VARNEY ED., THE CARTELS AND LENIENCY REVIEW 319 (2013). 
 23. See Janet Novak, Fix and Tell, FORBES, May 4, 1998, at 46-47 (“Attention price 
fixers-and bid-riggers. Confess and the U.S. Department of Justice will let you off the hook. 
But hurry! Only one conspirator per cartel.”). 
 24. The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Pub. 
L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). See generally John C. Coates & Suraj Srinivasan, SOX 
After Ten Years: A Multidisciplinary Review, 28 ACCOUNTING HORIZONS 627 (2014); John 
C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 91 
(2007). 
 25. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section, Evaluation of Corporate 
Compliance Programs, Feb. 8, 2017. The policy was updated in 2019. See U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Criminal Division, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (Apr. 30, 2019). 
 26. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance 
Programs in Criminal Antitrust Investigations (July 2019) [hereinafter Antitrust Compliance 
Policy]; Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim, Wind of Change: A New Model for 
Incentivizing Antitrust Compliance Programs, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at New York 
University School of Law (July 11, 2019). 
 27.  Antitrust Compliance Policy, id., § 2 (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis 
added). 
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To illustrate the differences between involvement in violations and 
oversight of violations, consider the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate 
(“Libor”) and Foreign Currency Exchange Rates (“Forex”) antitrust 
cases.28 These cases concerned conspiracies to manipulate benchmark 
rates. Motivated to boost their perceived performance, traders in 
competing banks conspired to manipulate Libor and Forex. A large 
number of traders were indicted and prosecuted for their participation in 
the conspiracies. There was no evidence that the directors or senior 
officers of the colluding banks were aware of the conspiracies and, thus, 
none were held liable.29 The Libor and Forex cases and similar ones raise 
concerns that profitable violations of law are products of internal 
policies. 
B. Compliance and the Pursuit of Profit 
At the heart of most antitrust violations lie hopes to increase profits 
or reduce losses. As entrepreneur and venture capitalist Peter Thiel 
noted, “competition is for losers.”30 Antitrust law bans transactions, 
agreements, and business practices that harm or tend to harm the 
competitive process, even when the involved firms expect to gain from 
them. Such restrictions on the pursuit of profit are rather common. Many 
areas of law impose restrictions on certain profit-seeking activities to 
ensure that the pursuit of profit does not generate excessive externalities 
or is otherwise incompatible with public policies. Restrictions on 
profitable activities, however, tend to be controversial, chiefly because 
the diagnosis of the alleged social costs—harm to competition in the 
context of antitrust law—is imprecise and may be incorrect. 
For the analysis here, three themes are particularly important: 
profitable violations, decentralization of organizational control, and 
organizational culture. 
(1) Profitable Violations. Several commentators have argued that 
managers have neither legal nor ethical obligations to comply with 
applicable laws when violations are profitable to the firm.31 For example, 
 
 28. For summaries of the relevant facts, see Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & D. Daniel Sokol, 
The Lessons from Libor for Detection and Deterrence of Cartel Wrongdoing, 3 HARV. BUS. 
L. REV. ONLINE 10 (2012); Martin D.D. Evans, Forex trading and the WMR Fix, 87 J. BANK. 
& FIN. 233 (2018). 
 29. The CEO of one of the banks, Barclays, was ousted supposedly for the bank’s failure 
to detect its traders’ misconduct. See Andrew Ross Sorokin, The Damnedest People Ride the 
Subway, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 5, 2013, at 20. 
 30.  Peter Thiel, Competition Is for Losers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2014, at C1. 
 31. See AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 2.01, comment g 
(1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES] (“It is sometimes maintained that whether a corporation 
should adhere to a given legal rule may properly depend on a kind of cost-benefit analysis, in 
which probable corporate gains are weighed against either probable social costs.”). For a 
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Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel posited that “[s]ome antitrust 
violations are efficient, just as some breaches of contract are efficient.”32 
This notion of efficient antitrust violations is nothing more than a pretext 
for objections to antitrust enforcement, which should be understood as a 
cynical disregard of effects on consumers.33 Antitrust violations intend 
to increase profit, are hard to detect, and are hard to prove.34 Ex ante, 
most antitrust violations may appear profitable. Thus, under the efficient 
violation thesis, D&O arguably have no legal obligations to assure 
compliance with antitrust law. This notion of efficient violations made 
some inroads into antitrust law. During the past three decades, the 
Supreme Court has been dismissive of the “slight benefits of antitrust 
intervention,”35 emphasizing the costs of false positives (erroneous 
condemnation of business practices),36 similarities between competitive 
and anticompetitive behavior,37 and the “unusually serious mistakes” of 
antitrust courts.38 
(2) Decentralization of Control. Organizations integrate activities 
to generate value through efficiencies and economic power.39 
Organizational scale and scope resulting from such integrations, in turn, 
require decentralization of control and diffusion of responsibilities.40 But 
 
recent formulation of the idea, see Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 
709 (2019). 
 32. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender 
Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1157 (1982). 
 33. See Barak Orbach, The Consumer Welfare Controversy, CPI ANTITRUST 
CHRONICLE, Nov. 2019, at 22. 
 34. See D. Daniel Sokol, Cartels, Corporate Compliance, and What Practitioners Really 
Think About Enforcement, 78 ANTITRUST L. J. 201 (2012). 
 35. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 399-
400 (2004). 
 36. See, e.g., Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 281 (2007) 
(expressing concerns regarding “the nuanced nature of the evidentiary evaluations necessary 
to separate the permissible from the impermissible [in antitrust law].”); Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) (arguing that “mistaken inferences 
in [antitrust] cases . . . are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust 
laws are designed to protect.”). See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of 
“Error Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong With Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2015). 
 37. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-54 (2007); Matsushita, 
475 U.S. at 574. 
 38. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 264. See generally Orbach, The Consumer Welfare 
Controversy, supra note 33. 
 39. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). See also 
GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL INVESTMENT RESEARCH, GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL 
INVESTMENT RESEARCH (Feb. 12, 2014) (advising investors to “look for opportunities created 
by disruptive consolidation,” because “[a]n oligopolistic market structure can turn a cut-
throat, commodity industry into a highly profitable one through reduced competitive intensity, 
scale cost benefits, higher barriers to entry and more.”). 
 40. Decentralization of control and responsibilities should not be confused with the 
notion of centralized management. Ultimately, a corporation has and should have one 
management team that delegates tasks to subordinates. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward 
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decentralization of managerial and monitoring tasks comes with a 
variety of inefficiencies and agency costs. In decentralized 
organizations, the downward communication of goals and policies and 
the upward communication of challenges and problems are indirect, as 
information is transmitted through a hierarchy of agents and a network 
of communication channels.41 Under such conditions, corporate agents 
who engaged in unlawful or unethical conduct can be described as “bad 
apples” or “rogue employees,” while D&O may remain unaware of any 
unlawful or unethical conduct. 
(3) Organizational Culture. Organizational culture is a maze of 
formal and informal norms, beliefs, authorities, responsibilities, and 
values that are understood by insiders as “the way we do things around 
here.”42 Formal policies and stated values are readily available and 
verifiable, often set compliance standards, and rarely prescribe unlawful 
or unethical conduct. By contrast, informal organizational norms are 
elusive, especially for outsiders, and frequently shape the approaches of 
fiduciaries toward compliance with formal policies. That is, informal 
norms may reflect and deepen existing gaps between formal policies and 
compliance patterns and, once such norms form, they reinforce patterns 
of selective compliance. For example, insiders tend to know more about 
strictly enforced policies and know less about neglected policies. This 
happens because informal norms—the understanding of enforcement 
patterns—shape the understanding of formal policies. Further, 
inconsistencies among formal policies sometimes play a role in the 
formation of selective compliance. For example, tensions between 
performance and compliance standards sometimes create incentives to 
engage in unlawful conduct. Where a company fails to detect and 
address such discrepancies, violations of law are likely to follow.43 
 
Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1051 (2010) (“One of the great virtues of the 
corporate form is centralized management.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Independent Directors of the Board of Wells Fargo & Company, Sales 
Practices Investigation Report (Apr. 10, 2017) (finding that demanding performance goals in 
a highly decentralized company contributed to unlawful and unethical conduct of employees). 
 42. Malvin Bower, Company Philosophy: ‘The Way We Do Things Around Here’, 2003 
MCKINSEY Q. 111 (2003). See generally Edgar H. Schein, Corporate Culture, 4 INT’L 
ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. & BEHAVIORAL SCI. 923 (Neil Smelser ed. 2015); Luigi Guiso et al., 
The Value of Corporate Culture, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 60 (2015); George Baker et al., Informal 
Authority in Organizations, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 56 (1999); Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 
Formal and Real Authority in Organizations, 105 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1997); Jacques Crémer, 
Corporate Culture and Shared Knowledge, 2 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 351 (1993); JOHN P 
KOTTER & JAMES L. HESKETT, CORPORATE CULTURE AND PERFORMANCE (1992); David M. 
Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 90 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds. 1990); TERRENCE E. DEAL & ALLAN 
A. KENNEDY, CORPORATE CULTURES (1982). 
 43. See, e.g., Max H. Bazerman & Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Ethical Breakdowns, 89(4) HARV. 
BUS. REV. 58 (2011). 
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C. Core Legal Standards 
D&O liability for antitrust violations can be found in antitrust, 
corporate and securities laws. Under antitrust law, D&O may be held 
criminally and civilly liable for antitrust violations, where they “actively 
and knowingly engaged in a scheme designed to achieve anticompetitive 
ends,” including by exerting their influence “to shape corporate 
intentions.”44 Specifically, D&O who formulated, negotiated, 
authorized, directed, or executed policies or agreements which 
constituted steps in the progress of an antitrust violation may be 
criminally and civilly liable for the violation,45 including treble 
damages.46 Under corporate law, D&O who were aware of violations of 
law or failed to make good faith efforts to oversee material risks and 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations may be held liable for 
losses caused by unlawful acts.47 Under securities law, D&O may be 
 
 44. Brown v. Donco Enterprises, Inc., 783 F.2d 644, 646-47 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 45. See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 406, 416 (1962) (holding that a 
corporate officer may be “subject to prosecution under Section 1 of the Sherman Act whenever 
he knowingly participates in effecting the illegal contract, combination, or conspiracy—be he 
one who authorizes, orders, or helps perpetrate the crime.”); Journal Co. v. U.S., 342 U.S. 143 
(1951) (holding that corporate officers participated in an unlawful monopolization scheme); 
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 401-02 (1945) (holding that directors 
and officers may be liable for participating in “violations in their capacities as officers and 
directors.”); Phelps Dodge Refining Corp. v. FTC, 139 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1943) (A 
“director, merely by reason of his office, is not personally liable for the torts of his corporation; 
he must be shown to have personally voted for or otherwise participated in them.”); In re 
Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litig, 801 F. Supp. 2d 705, 736 (E.D. Tenn. 2011) (holding that 
the “standard for individual liability” is “active and knowing participation.”); Reifert v. South 
Central Wisconsin MLS Corp., 368 F. Supp. 2d 912, 913 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (holding that 
affirmation of an unlawful corporate policy is by itself sufficient to sustain antitrust liability.); 
Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 841, 852 
(N.D. Cal. 1979) (“Personal liability must be founded upon specific acts by the individual 
director or officer.”); Deaktor v. Fox Grocery Co., 332 F. Supp. 536, 542 (W.D. Pa. 1971) 
(“Under the antitrust laws the liability of the participating officers of the offending corporation 
has long been established.”); Bergjans Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers, 241 F. 
Supp. 476, 482 (E.D. Mo. 1965) (“Corporate officers, directors and agents are personally 
liable for acts of the corporation that violate the antitrust laws if they participate in those 
actions or authorize them.”); Shoenberg Farms, Inc. v. Denver Milk Producers, Inc., 231 F. 
Supp. 266, 269-70 (D. Colo. 1964) (“A corporate officer, acting as such, can individually 
[engage in an antitrust violation] for which he is personally responsible.”); Kentucky-
Tennessee Light & Power Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 37 F. Supp. 728, 738 (W.D. Ky. 1941) 
(rejecting the argument that a corporate officer could not be liable for antitrust violations of 
the corporation, stating that an “agent does not escape personal liability because the act 
complained of imposes liability upon the principal.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Am. Soc. of Mech. Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 
(1982); Higbie v. Kopy-Kat, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 808, 810 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Cott Beverage Corp. 
v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 300, 301-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (holding that 
individual directors could be held personally liable in a treble damage action brought under 
the Clayton Act); Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 37 F. Supp. 
728, 738 (W.D. Ky. 1941) (noting that an “agent does not escape personal liability because 
the act complained of imposes liability upon the principal.”). 
 47. See infra Section IV. 
2020] D&O LIABILITY FOR ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS 537 
held liable for misleading statements and omissions concerning antitrust 
risk.48 
II. Illustrations 
Many legal landmarks may be used to illustrate how courts and 
enforcement agencies evaluate patterns of compliance in large 
organizations. I use three legal episodes for this purpose: (1) The 
Electrical Conspiracy, (2) Hilton Hotels’ antitrust liability for actions of 
a rogue agent, and (3) Caremark’s formulation of the corporate oversight 
duty. 
A. The Electrical Conspiracy 
The “Electrical Conspiracy” was an elaborate price-fixing and bid-
rigging scheme of the large U.S. heavy electrical equipment 
manufacturers.49 The prosecution of the cartel and subsequent litigation 
produced two important legal landmarks. First, the criminal convictions 
of the corporate and individual defendants marked a turning point in 
antitrust enforcement. Until the revelation of the Electrical Conspiracy, 
“the general attitude [was] that price-fixing was not really a crime in the 
common understanding of that term.”50 Imprisonment sentences were 
imposed infrequently, “mostly in cases involving either acts of violence 
or union misconduct.”51 The prosecution of the Electrical Conspiracy 
resulted in record fines and the first prison sentences for executives for 
their participation in antitrust violations.52 It was estimated that 2,233 
private lawsuits followed the convictions.53 Second, a derivative action 
against D&O of Allis-Chalmers, the third largest equipment 
manufacturer, prompted a judicial analysis of the proposition that 
corporate directors had an affirmative duty to oversee legal 
 
 48. See infra Sections IV.D. 
 49. See Robert R. Faulkner et al., Crime By Committee: Conspirators and Company Men 
in the Illegal Electrical Industry Cartel, 1954-1959, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 511 (2003); Gilbert 
Geis, White Collar Crime: The Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust Case of 1961, in 
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS: A TYPOLOGY 139 (Marshall B. Clinard & Richard Quinney 
eds., 1967); John G. Fuller, THE GENTLEMAN CONSPIRATORS: THE STORY OF THE PRICE-
FIXERS IN THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY (1962); Richard A. Smith, The Incredible Electrical 
Conspiracy: Part I, FORTUNE, Apr. 1961, at 132; Richard A. Smith, The Incredible Electrical 
Conspiracy: Part II, FORTUNE, May. 1961, at 161. 
 50. Anthony Lewis, Trust Case Raises Big Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1961, at E6. 
 51. Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. L. & ECON. 
365, 389 (1970). 
 52. The government prosecuted 29 corporations and 45 individuals who pleaded guilty 
or no defense. See Nate White, Indictment of the Organization Man, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Feb. 8, 1961, at 7. 
 53. Posner, supra note 51, at 371, 389. 
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compliance.54 The Delaware Chancery Court ruled and the Delaware 
Supreme Court affirmed that, absent cause for suspicion, directors did 
not have such duty.55 
Additionally, studies of the Electrical Conspiracy led to the 
recognition that cartel members have powerful incentives to cheat and, 
therefore, cartels tend to utilize enforcement mechanisms.56 This insight 
has profoundly influenced the development of antitrust law and policy. 
In the context of proof of unlawful conspiracy, it contributed to doctrinal 
emphasis on evidence of communication among competitors. A more 
nuanced thinking about the incentives of cartel members inspired the 
development of the leniency program. 
The Electrical Conspiracy trials pressed the question of whether 
D&O of large and decentralized organizations should be held 
accountable for wrongdoing committed by employees. No director or 
senior officer was criminally prosecuted in connection with the cartel, 
only mid-level managers.57 The government was “unable to uncover 
probative evidence” that could secure convictions “of those in the 
highest echelons of the corporations.”58 Nonetheless, the trial judge 
believed that the individual defendants “were torn between conscience 
and an approved corporate policy with rewarding objectives.”59 He 
stated in the courtroom that the “real blame” was at “the doorstep of the 
corporate defendants and those who guide[d] and direct[ed] their 
policy,” and that “one would be most naïve . . . to believe that . . . [the] 
facts were unknown to those responsible for the conduct of the 
corporation.”60 Testimonies of employees of the corporate defendants 
supported this conclusion. They described organizational systems in 
which the senior management discouraged aggressive competition, mid-
level managers operated the cartel believing that they were expected to 
do so, and compliance policies were not followed.61 
Allis Chalmers was one of the corporate defendants. The company 
employed more than 30,000 people, and operated sixteen plants in the 
United States and eight plants in other countries. The company’s 
salesforce included over 5,000 dealers and distributors working from 
 
 54. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 182 A.2d 328, 332 (Del. Ch. 1962) 
[hereinafter Graham I], aff’d, 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963) [hereinafter Graham II]. 
 55. Graham I, 182 A.2d at 332; Graham II, 188 A.2d at 85. 
 56. See Faulkner et al., supra note 49; Kenneth G. Elzinga, New Developments on the 
Cartel Front, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 3, 6-9 (1984); George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 
72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964). 
 57. See Faulkner et al., supra note 49; Geis, supra note 49. 
 58. Judge’s Statement in the Electrical Antitrust Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1961, at 26. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Geis, supra note 49, at 147-50. 
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145 sales offices.62 During the relevant period, the company’s annual 
revenues ranged from $530 to $550 million.63 Managers of the Power 
Equipment Division, including managers of the Division’s ten 
departments, colluded with their counterparts in rival companies to fix 
prices and bids through frequent communication. The Power Equipment 
Division was part of the company’s Industries Group, which had five 
divisions and was headed by an officer who served on the company’s 
board of directors. This director-officer “made it clear to his staff as well 
as representatives of Allis-Chalmers’ business competitors that it was 
the firm policy of his company that ruthless price cutting should be 
avoided.”64 
Allis-Chalmers’ “operating policy” rested on decentralization “by 
the delegation of authority to the lowest possible management level 
capable of fulfilling the delegated responsibility.”65 Prices of products 
were ordinarily set by department managers, who occasionally conferred 
with the division’s manager.66 For the “complexity of the company’s 
operations,” the board of directors considered “matters concerning the 
general business policy of the company.”67 The directors, however, did 
not “consider in detail specific problems of the various divisions” and 
did not “participate in decisions fixing the prices of specific products.”68 
The company had no antitrust compliance policies, although it operated 
under consent decrees that settled prior investigations into price fixing 
schemes of heavy electrical equipment.69 The company’s directors were 
arguably unaware of these consent decrees.70 
The Delaware Chancery Court and Supreme Court emphasized that 
decentralization and diffusion of responsibilities were necessary for 
large businesses. They portrayed oversight and, specifically, compliance 
policies as intrusive and costly and ruled that, in the absence of grounds 
for suspicion, the directors were “entitled to rely on the honesty and 
integrity of their subordinates.”71 Both courts believed that the consent 
decrees “were notice of nothing.”72 
 
 62. Graham I, 182 A.2d at 329; Graham II, 188 A.2d at 128. 
 63. Graham I, 182 A.2d at 329; Graham II, 188 A.2d at 128. 
 64. Graham I, 182 A.2d at 330. 
 65. Graham II, 188 A.2d at 128. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 129-30. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Graham II, 188 A.2d at 130; Graham I, 182 A.2d at 332 (holding that the directors 
“had no reason to believe that minor officials in the lower echelons of an industrial empire 
had become involved in violations of the federal antitrust laws.”). 
 72. Graham II, 188 A.2d at 130. 
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B. Hilton Hotels’ Rogue Agent 
Hilton Hotels concerned a cartel among purchasing agents of hotels 
and restaurants in Portland, Oregon.73 The manager of Hilton Portland 
instructed the hotel’s purchasing agent to take no part in the cartel. The 
agent testified that he had ignored the instruction because of his “anger 
and personal pique” toward one of the hotel’s suppliers.74 Hilton Hotels 
Corporation tried to exculpate itself by arguing that the agent’s acts were 
unauthorized.75 The trial judge rejected the argument. He instructed the 
jury that, where an agent acts with apparent authority, his actions may 
be attributed to the organization, even when the actions violate 
organizational policies and instructions.76 Hilton Hotels appealed. 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the jury instruction, stating that, under 
antitrust law, “a corporation is liable for acts of its agents within the 
scope of their authority even when done against company orders.”77 The 
court’s analysis of corporate criminal liability under antitrust law is 
insightful. 
First, the Ninth Circuit recognized that, with some exceptions, 
proof of antitrust violations requires evidence of general intent—
namely, knowledge of the underlying facts. Specific intent—namely 
conscious wrongdoing—is not an element of most antitrust offenses.78 
Second, the court was critical of Hilton Hotels’ “strenuous efforts” to 
escape accountability for employees’ misconduct.79 The court observed 
that antitrust corporate liability intends to stimulate “a maximum effort” 
to assure compliance with antitrust law by holding organizations 
accountable for acts of “those to whom they choose to delegate the 
conduct of their affairs.”80 Third, the court recognized that, in “large, 
complex, and highly decentralized corporate business enterprises,” it is 
often difficult to identify the individuals responsible for antitrust 
violations, as corporate acts are typically products of “intricate business 
processes, practices, and arrangements.”81 The court further observed 
that antitrust violations in large, decentralized organizations are “a likely 
consequence of the pressure to maximize profits that is commonly 
 
 73. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972). 
 74. Id. at 1004. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. An agent has apparent authority when third parties could reasonably believe that 
the agent had the authority. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1005. See generally Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 657 (2001). 
 79. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d at 1006. 
 80. Id. at 1006. See also United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 126 (1958) 
(noting that entity liability under antitrust law intends to assure that agents, regardless of their 
seniority, comply with the antitrust law). 
 81. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d at 1006. 
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imposed . . . upon managing agents and, in turn, upon lesser 
employees.”82 For these reasons, the court concluded that, under antitrust 
law, a corporation is liable for the “acts of its agents in the scope of their 
employment, even though contrary to general corporate policy and 
express instructions to the agent.”83 Accordingly, a corporate defendant 
cannot “gain exculpation by issuing general instructions without 
undertaking to enforce those instructions by means commensurate with 
the obvious risks.”84 
C. Caremark’s Oversight Duty 
Caremark is one of the most consequential Delaware decisions.85 
Writing for the Delaware Court of Chancery, Chancellor William Allen 
formulated the duty to monitor in an opinion that transformed corporate 
law.86 
Caremark concerned contractual arrangements between the 
company and physicians, which Caremark’s salespersons negotiated 
with physicians on behalf of the company. To induce physicians to refer 
patients to Caremark’s products and services, these contracts provided 
for payments that constituted unlawful kickbacks.87 As a result of the 
alleged violations, Caremark was subject to extensive federal 
investigations for four years, paid $250 million in fines and damages, 
and reorganized its operation to improve compliance.88 The plaintiffs 
argued on behalf of the company that Caremark’s directors breached 
their fiduciary duties by failing to monitor and supervise the enterprise. 
The Chancery Court reviewed a proposed settlement. 
Caremark was a relatively large company with approximately 7,000 
employees in ninety branches.89 It had a “decentralized management 
structure.”90 Responding to the federal investigations of alleged 
kickback arrangements, Caremark implemented an oversight system that 
included (1) a formal anti-kickback policy prohibiting payments 
intending to induce benefits to the company,91 (2) an annual review of 
the anti-kickback policy,92 (3) “an internal audit plan designed to assure 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1007. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone: Directors’ Evolving Duty 
to Monitor, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323, 325 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009). 
 86. See infra Section IV.A. 
 87. Caremark, 698 A.3d at 962. 
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 89. Id. at 962. 
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compliance with business and ethics policies,”93 and (4) a review of the 
company’s control system by outside auditors.94 During the period of the 
investigations, Caremark hardened its compliance system, although 
internal and external examinations of the system did not identify any 
material vulnerabilities.95 Additionally, the company made “attempts to 
centralize its management structure in order to increase supervision over 
its branch operations.”96 
The proposed settlement that the Chancery Court reviewed gave the 
plaintiffs “express assurances” that Caremark would implement “a more 
centralized, active supervisory system.”97 Concluding that the plaintiffs’ 
claims were “extremely weak,” Chancellor Allen ruled that the proposed 
settlement was an adequate, reasonable, and beneficial outcome for all 
parties.98 Along the way, Chancellor Allen noted that a “rational person 
attempting in good faith to meet” her fiduciary obligations is bound to 
take into account the “increasing tendency, especially under federal law, 
to employ the criminal law to assure corporate compliance with external 
legal requirements.”99 Accordingly, the Chancellor wrote, to satisfy their 
fiduciary obligations to be reasonably informed, directors must assure 
themselves that “reasonably designed” information and reporting 
systems exist in the organization.100 This review standard provides that 
courts might hold directors liable for oversight failures, where the 
directors acted in “bad faith,” which Chancellor Allen interpreted as a 
“sustained or systematic failure of a director to exercise reasonable 
oversight.”101 
D. Summary 
The foregoing discussion illustrates the intricacy of violations in 
big corporations. D&O may be unaware of violations of laws and 
regulations, even when they set policies that incentivize employees to 
engage in such violations. The purpose of oversight liability is to 
incentivize D&O to make good faith efforts to implement protocols and 
procedures that are likely to improve organizational compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations. 
 
 93. Caremark, 698 A.3d at 963. 
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III. Antitrust Violations 
Antitrust policies related to individual accountability for antitrust 
violations have developed in two distinctive eras of sympathy for 
individual defendants. First, until the early 1960s, antitrust enforcement 
was periodically vigorous,102 but the prosecution of executives for 
antitrust violations was infrequent and ineffective, largely due to 
sentiments that antitrust violations were not “crimes.”103 Second, since 
the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court has been persistently narrowing the 
scope of antitrust law for skepticism of the virtues of antitrust 
enforcement.104 During this period, the DOJ and FTC have developed 
policies to address individual accountability and private actions have 
considerably evolved. 
A. The Personification of Antitrust Offenders 
The language and legislative history of the Sherman, Clayton, and 
FTC Acts unequivocally indicate that, in passing these statutes, 
Congress expected the enforcement agencies to hold D&O accountable 
for antitrust violations.105 
The Sherman and Clayton Acts refer to antitrust offenders as 
“persons” and provide that the word “person,” or “persons,” may mean 
organizations (“corporations and associations”), not only individuals.106 
By contrast, the FTC Act uses the phrase “person, partnership, or 
corporation” to describe offenders.107 Since 1974, Sections 1, 2, and 3 of 
the Sherman Act separate corporations from “any other person.”108 
Natural persons who violate these provisions may be fined or 
imprisoned, whereas corporations may be punished by much larger 
fines. 
The legislative history of the principal antitrust statutes is even 
more telling. When Congress debated the Sherman Act, the notion of 
corporate criminal liability was still new. Corporate defendants insisted 
that criminal intent could not be imputed to and criminal sanctions could 
 
 102. See Barak Orbach, The Present New Antitrust Era, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439 
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 103. See supra Section II.C; United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 411 
(7th Cir. 1941) (“We cannot understand how the jury could have acquitted all of the individual 
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not be imposed on corporations.109 This approach established a 
jurisprudential irony. Judicial interpretations of the word “person” 
included corporations, only for the purpose of defending corporations. 
The interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment included corporations,110 while the same word in criminal 
statutes meant natural persons, not corporations.111 
The drafters of the Sherman Act were aware of the uncertainty that 
surrounded the idea of corporate criminal liability. Senator John 
Sherman believed that a criminal statute “can only reach officers or 
agents employed by the corporation,” because a “corporation cannot be 
indicted or punished except through civil process.”112 Accordingly, 
Senator Sherman’s anti-trust bill and its amendments distinguished 
between “corporations” and “persons.”113 They declared that any person 
who enters into any “arrangement, contract, agreement, trust, or 
combination” in restraint of trade, “either on his own account or as agent 
or attorney for another, or as an officer, agent, or stockholder of any 
corporation, or as a trustee, committee, or in any capacity whatever, shall 
be guilty of a high misdemeanor.”114 Additionally, Senator Sherman’s 
bill provided for civil actions by the federal government and private 
parties against corporations and individuals. The Senate Judiciary 
Committee redrafted Senator Sherman’s bill.115 Among other things, the 
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Committee eliminated the distinction between “corporations” and 
“persons” and clarified that, under the statute, a person could be a 
corporation. Congress passed the Judiciary Committee’s bill, not the bill 
that Senator Sherman drafted. 
In 1909, the Supreme Court held that a corporation may be 
criminally liable for offenses committed by agents acting within the 
scope of their authority for the benefit of the corporation.116 Nonetheless, 
many believed that new federal legislation was needed to supplement the 
Sherman Act. Antitrust enforcement in the first years of the Sherman Act 
was disappointing and contributed to a massive merger wave, which 
resulted in increased concentration in numerous industries.117 Further, 
the adoption of the rule of reason in 1911 was perceived as emasculation 
of the Sherman Act. In 1912, the Democratic Party took over the White 
House and Congress, with a platform declaring that a “private monopoly 
is indefensible and intolerable” and calling for “the vigorous 
enforcement of the criminal as well as the civil law against trusts and 
trust officials.”118 President Wilson urged Congress to adopt legislation 
that would hold corporate agents “individually responsible” for antitrust 
violations, arguing that acts of corporations were done “at the command 
or upon the initiative” of individuals.119 In 1914, Congress passed the 
Clayton and FTC Acts that emphasized that antitrust enforcement must 
reach individuals. 
Stated simply, Congress enacted the principal antitrust statutes 
believing that personal accountability was the most effective means to 
enforce competition policy. Expressions of this view have always 
decorated the narrative of antitrust enforcement.120 Nonetheless, until the 
mid-1990s, criminal prosecution of individuals for antitrust violations 
was very limited in scope.121 In most years, more corporations than 
individuals were indicted for alleged antitrust violations. Since the mid-
1990s, in every given year, the number of indicted individuals has been 
larger than the number of indicted corporations. This trend has not 
changed during the Trump Administration, when criminal antitrust 
enforcement has been neglected (thus far). The number of criminal 
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antitrust cases fell from sixty-six in 2015 to twenty-eight in 2018. 
Corporate criminal fines dropped from $3.6 billion in 2015 to $172 
million in 2018. 
 
Source: Department of Justice Antitrust Division. 
B. Section 14 of the Clayton Act: Statutory Personal Liability 
Section 14 of the Clayton Act, titled “Liability of Directors and 
Agents of Corporation,” emphasizes that an individual may be 
criminally liable for antitrust violations of the corporation, where her 
actions constituted steps in the progress of a Sherman Act violation, even 
where such actions, in and of themselves, did not constitute a 
violation.122 It provides: 
Whenever a corporation shall violate any of the penal provisions of 
the antitrust laws, such violation shall be deemed to be also that of 
the individual directors, officers, or agents . . . who shall have 
authorized, ordered, or done any of the acts constituting in whole or 
in part such violation, and such violation shall be deemed a 
misdemeanor.123 
Section 14 suffers from three significant shortcomings that 
compromise its usefulness. First, individual liability under Section 14 
requires a conviction of the corporation, whereas individual liability 
under the Sherman Act does not. Second, Section 14 includes the 
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original language of the Sherman Act, providing that antitrust violations 
were misdemeanors carrying a maximum fine of $5,000 and up to one 
year in prison. Since the enactment of the Clayton Act, however, 
Congress has amended this Sherman Act several times, but failed to 
amend Section 14. Today, a Sherman Act violation is a felony, 
“punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any 
other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, 
or by both.” The resulting differences between Section 14 and the penal 
provisions of the Sherman Act eroded the significance of Section 14.124 
Third, Section 14 addresses D&O criminal liability, but there is no 
corresponding statutory provision addressing D&O civil liability under 
antitrust law.125 For these shortcomings, Section 14 is largely symbolic. 
Several old cases suggest that Section 14 possibly expanded the scope 
of the Sherman Act and created new antitrust offenses.126 With the 
exception of these cases, it is difficult to identify any actual effect of 
Section 14 on antitrust enforcement and individual accountability. 
Discussions of individual accountability for antitrust violations in 
judicial opinions and the literature rarely mention Section 14.127 
The ineffectiveness of Section 14 deserves attention. Congress 
passed the provision responding to “the sympathy shown to corporate 
officers by judges, juries, and prosecutors” and concerns that the 
Sherman Act “did not cover officers who merely authorized or ordered 
the commission of the offense.”128 Section 14, thus, intended to serve as 
“a reaffirmation of the Sherman Act’s basic penal provisions and a 
mandate to prosecutors to bring all responsible persons to justice.”129 In 
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Union Bldg. Materials Corp., 6 Haw. App. 125, 136 (1985); Higbie v. Kopy-Kat, Inc., 391 F. 
Supp. 808, 810 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Cott Beverage Corp. v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 146 
F.Supp. 300, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
 126. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); Van Lines, 202 
F. Supp. 639; Atlantic Commission, 45 F.Supp. at 194-95. 
 127. See, e.g., Gregory Walker, Note: The Personal Liability of Corporate Officers in 
Private Actions Under the Sherman Act: Murphy Tugboat in Distress, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 
909 (1987); Richard A. Whiting, Antitrust and the Corporate Executive, 47 VA. L. REV. 929, 
931-32, 942 (1961); Victor H. Kramer, Interlocking Directorships and the Clayton Act after 
35 Years, 59 YALE L.J. 1266 (1950); Gardiner C. Means, Interlocking Directorates, 8 ENCYC. 
SOC. SCI. 148 (1932). 
 128. Wise, 370 U.S. at 413. 
 129. Id. at 414. 
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practice, however, Section 14 has been a toothless legislative 
commitment to hold directors, officers, and other agents accountable for 
antitrust violations. Cynics may argue that the ineffectiveness of Section 
14 was by design. 
C. Section 8 of the Clayton Act: Interlocking Directors and 
Officers 
Section 8 of the Clayton Act bans D&O horizontal interlocks. It 
prohibits, with certain exceptions, one person from serving as a director 
or officer of competing companies when two thresholds are met.130 The 
exceptions include “banks, banking associations, and trust companies,” 
which other statutes cover.131 The thresholds—Section 8’s safe 
harbors—are de minimis exemptions.132 They refer to the aggregate 
“capital, surplus, and undivided profits,” as well as the “competitive 
sales” of the companies, and are revised annually by the FTC.133 
Competing firms under Section 8 are companies that “by virtue of their 
business and location of operation, . . . the elimination of competition by 
agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the 
antitrust laws.”134  
Thus, unless protected by Section 8’s exceptions or safe harbors, an 
interlock between two companies is unlawful, where a price-fixing 
agreement between the companies would be illegal under antitrust 
law.135 Under the “deputization theory,” Section 8 also bans indirect 
interlocks that meet these standards. Indirect interlocks are situations 
where different individuals, who are agents of the same person—an 
organization or individual—serve as directors or officers of competing 
companies.136 
When Congress passed the Clayton Act, interlocks were so 
prevalent that there were concerns that interlocking directors could not 
 
 130. 15 U.S.C. § 19. See generally AM. BAR ASSOC., INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES 
HANDBOOK (2011). 
 131. 15 U.S.C. § 19(a). The exceptions have changed several times since the enactment 
of the Clayton Act. AM. BAR ASSOC., supra note 130, at 4-7, 12, 44-48, 76-78. 
 132. AM. BAR ASSOC., supra note 130, at 10-11. 
 133. 15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1)(B). “Competitive sales,” under Section 8, means the annual 
gross revenues that the products and services in competition generate in that corporation’s last 
completed fiscal year. 15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(2). 
 134. 15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1)(B). 
 135. See Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 484 F.2d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that, 
where any horizontal agreement would violate any of the antitrust laws, interlocks between 
the same companies would be unlawful under Section 8). 
 136. See, e.g., Reading Intern’l v. Oaktree Capital Management, LLC, 317 F. Supp. 2d 
301, 326-31; Square D Co. v. Schneider S.A., 760 F. Supp. 362, 366-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); 
Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211, 216-17 (4th Cir. 
1987). 
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satisfy their fiduciary responsibilities.137 Such concerns contributed to 
the enactment of Section 8, but are not part of the statute, whose purpose 
is “to nip in the bud incipient violations of the antitrust laws by removing 
the opportunity or temptation to such violations through interlocking 
directorates.”138 The enforcement of the ban on horizontal interlocks has 
been limited and infrequent, largely for skepticism about their 
anticompetitive effects.139 
The growing concentration in the US economy revived concerned 
about horizontal interlocks. For example, in 2016, the Justice 
Department required the restructuring of a transaction, in which one 
company acquired about twenty percent of the outstanding stock of a 
competitor and the right to nominate one member of the competitor’s 
board of directors.140 In this spirit, responding to government inquiries, 
high-tech companies dismantled horizontal interlocks. Directors who 
served simultaneously on the boards of Apple and Google resigned from 
one board of directors to end an FTC investigation.141 In May 2019, 
Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim, the head of the DOJ’s 
Antitrust Division, stated that the Division “regularly encounters 
potential Section 8 violations” and had been evaluating how to adjust the 
interpretation of Section 8 to “modern corporate structures.”142 
In sum, Section 8 of the Clayton Act concerns individual directors 
and officers, but is not used to impose personal liability beyond the 
 
 137. See AM. BAR ASSOC., INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE 
CLAYTON ACT (Monograph 10, 1984) [hereinafter INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES] at 25; see 
generally Victor H. Kramer, Interlocking Directorships and the Clayton Act after 35 Years, 
59 YALE L.J. 1266 (1950); Gardiner C. Means, Interlocking Directorates, 8 ENCYC. SOC. SCI. 
148 (1932); see also Louis Brandeis, Serve One Master Only!, HARPER’S WKLY., Dec. 13, 
1913, at 10; Louis Brandeis, The Endless Chain, HARPER’S WKLY., Dec. 6, 1913, at 13; Louis 
Brandeis, Breaking the Money Trust, HARPER’S WKLY., Nov. 22, 1913, at 10. 
 138. SCM Corp. v. FTC, 565 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting United States v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
See also Square D Co. v. Schneider S.A., 760 F. Supp. 362, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The 
purposes of § 8 are to avoid the opportunity for the coordination of business decisions by 
competitors and to prevent the exchange of commercially sensitive information by 
competitors.”). 
 139. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASSOC., supra note 130, at 41-48; INTERLOCKING 
DIRECTORATES, supra note 133. See also TRW, Inc. v. FTC, 647 F.2d 942, 954 (9th Cir. 
1981) (holding that the FTC abused its discretion in issuing cease and desist orders proscribing 
interlocking directorates). 
 140. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Tullett Prebon and ICAP Restructure 
Transaction after Justice Department Expresses Concerns about Interlocking Directorates 
(July 14, 2016). 
 141. Jessica E. Vascellaro, Google Board Member Resigns Amid Inquiry, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 13, 2009, at B3; Jessica E. Vascellaro & Yukari Iwatani Kane, Schmidt Resigns His Seat 
on Apple’s Board, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2009, at B1. 
 142. Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim, Don’t “Take the Money and Run”: 
Antitrust in the Financial Sector, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at Fordham University 
School of Law (May 1, 2019). 
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enforcement of the ban itself.143 Nonetheless, enforcement actions 
involving alleged Section 8 violations can be disruptive for companies 
and burden executives. Thus, in the present era, direct and indirect 
horizontal interlocks are riskier than they used to be, especially for large 
companies. Importantly, the renewed attention to Section 8 enforcement 
is likely to add a layer of scrutiny for merger review. 
D. The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine 
Under the responsible corporate officer doctrine (“RCOD”), D&O 
may be criminally liable for a corporate crime that they had the authority 
to prevent, regardless of their knowledge of or participation in the acts 
that formed the offense. As explained by the Supreme Court: 
The liability of managerial officers [does] not depend on their 
knowledge of, or personal participation in, the act made criminal by 
. . . statute. Rather, where the statute under which they [are] 
prosecuted dispensed with ‘consciousness of wrongdoing,’ an 
omission or failure to act [is] deemed a sufficient basis for a 
responsible corporate agent’s liability.144 
RCOD permits prosecution of D&O for certain corporate crimes, 
without the need to establish their intent or involvement in wrongful 
conduct. RCOD prosecutions have been concentrated in criminal 
violations of the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. In Wise (1962), 
the Supreme Court ruled that RCOD may apply to criminal antitrust 
violations.145 In practice, however, the Justice Department rarely seeks 
to hold D&O liable for antitrust violations under RCOD. 
In the present era of growing emphasis on personal accountability 
and oversight standards, D&O must consider the risk of personal liability 
under RCOD for failing to implement effective oversight systems. 
IV. Corporate and Securities Law 
Antitrust investigations, litigation, settlements, and sanctions 
frequently trigger enforcement actions alleging that D&O breached their 
fiduciary duties or failed to disclose liability risks. The financial costs of 
such enforcement actions typically fall on the company itself, yet they 
discipline D&O. 
 
 143. See, e.g., United States v. eBay, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2013); 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1561 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding 
that for a recovery of monetary damages for a violation of Section 8, a private plaintiff must 
show actual harm). 
 144. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 670-71 (1975). See also United States v. 
DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626, 632 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Park to explain RCOD). 
 145. Wise, 370 U.S. at 416. 
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A. Oversight Liability 
Corporate law requires D&O to maximize corporate profit and 
shareholder gain,146 so long as the pursuit of profit complies with 
applicable laws and regulations.147 It is well settled that a “fiduciary may 
not choose to manage an entity in an illegal fashion, even if the fiduciary 
believes that the illegal activity will result in profits for the entity.”148 
This general standard, however, offers little guidance for garden variety 
situations in which the firm’s operations and management are 
decentralized, performance goals conflict with formal compliance 
policies, and effectiveness of internal controls is questionable. 
Caremark and its progeny examined alleged breaches of fiduciary 
duties by directors of large and decentralized corporations.149 As noted, 
under this line of cases, to satisfy their duty of loyalty, directors must 
make a good faith effort to exercise their duty of care by implementing 
and monitoring an oversight system.150 Stated simply, a breach of the 
duty of loyalty may be inferred from certain breaches of the duty of care. 
Correspondingly, a valid oversight claim must plead that (1) the D&O 
defendants knew or should have known that the company was violating 
applicable laws, (2) the D&O defendants acted in bad faith by failing to 
prevent or remedy those violations, and (3) the failures resulted in losses 
to the company. 
Most judicial decisions addressing oversight liability involve 
actions against directors; although, in practice, senior officers implement 
oversight systems and are responsible to report to the board about 
violations and the effectiveness of the systems. Until the Great 
Recession, there was some ambiguity as to the nature of the fiduciary 
 
 146. PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at § 2.01(a) (“[A] corporation . . . should have as its 
objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and 
shareholder gain.”). 
 147. PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at § 2.01(b) (A corporation is “obliged . . . to act within 
the boundaries set by law,” may “take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably 
regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business,” and “[m]ay devote a 
reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and 
philanthropic purposes,” “[e]ven if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby 
enhanced.”). 
 148. Metro Commc’n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Techs. Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 
131 (Del. Ch. 2004). See also Miller v. AT&T Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974); Abrams 
v. Allen, 74 N.E.2d 305, 306-07 (N.Y. 1947); Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc. 343, 345 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1909). In the 1960s, New York courts dismissed derivative actions seeking to hold 
corporate officials accountable for fines imposed on the corporation, where the plaintiff failed 
to prove that the illegal conduct did not pay off. PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at § 7.18 n.7. 
 149. See, e.g., Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019); Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106; 
Stone, 911 A.2d 362. 
 150. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 821; Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
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duties of corporate officers.151 In 2009, the Delaware Supreme Court 
settled the question holding that “the fiduciary duties of officers are the 
same as those of directors.”152 The consequences of fiduciary breaches, 
however, are not necessarily the same for directors and officers.153 In 
Delaware and many other jurisdictions, corporations may exculpate their 
directors from monetary liability for breaches the duty of care, but are 
not authorized to exculpate officers.154 Other differences may arise for 
the different functions that directors and senior officers serve. 
The oversight duty requires D&O to make good faith efforts to 
monitor material risks. Caremark introduced this duty, stating that to 
“satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the 
corporation,” directors must assure themselves that “information and 
reporting systems exist in the organization that are reasonably designed 
to provide” the board of directors and senior management with “timely, 
accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board, each 
within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning both the 
corporation’s compliance with law and its business performance.”155 
Other judicial formulations of the duty talk about a duty to “be active 
monitors of corporate performance,”156 “exercise oversight and to 
monitor the corporation’s operational viability, legal compliance, and 
financial performance[,]”157 and “put in place a reasonable board-level 
system of monitoring and reporting.”158 Importantly, the oversight duty 
is not an independent duty. Rather, it is derived from the duty of care 
and the duty of loyalty. 
 
 151. See, e.g., In re World Health Alternatives, Inc., 385 B.R. 576, 592-93 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2008) (evaluating the ambiguity and concluding that “it is clear” that under Delaware law, 
“both officers and directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation.”); In re Tower Air, Inc., 
416 F.3d 229, 238 n.12 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[We] assume . . . that theories of liability against 
corporate directors apply equally to corporate officers.”). See generally Lyman Johnson & 
Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers Advised About Fiduciary Duties?, 64 BUS. LAW. 1105 
(2009). 
 152. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 (Del. 2009). 
 153. See, e.g., Hampshire Grp., Ltd. v. Kuttner, No. CIV.A. 3607-VCS, 2010 WL 
2739995, at *11 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2010) (“There are important and interesting questions 
about the extent to which officers and employees should be more or less exposed to liability 
for breach of fiduciary duty than corporate directors.”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate 
Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 440 (2005) (arguing that the 
business judgment rule “does not and should not be extended to corporate officers in the same 
broad manner in which it is applied to directors.”). 
 154. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (permitting exculpation from liability 
for breaches of the duty of care by directors but not officers); McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 
1262, 1275 (Del. Ch. 2008) (Though an officer owes to the corporation identical fiduciary 
duties of care and loyalty as owed by directors, an officer does not benefit from the protections 
of a Section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision, which are only available to directors.”). 
 155. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
 156. Id. at 967. 
 157. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
 158. Id. at 821. 
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Judicial opinions addressing oversight claims frequently state that 
the implemented oversight system must be adequate, appropriate, and 
reasonable.159 Accordingly, nominal compliance with applicable laws 
and regulation does not satisfy the oversight duty.160 It cannot be said 
that nominal compliance is a product of good faith efforts to oversee 
legal risks. This reasonableness standard, however, concerns only 
decision-making procedures and does not extend to the effectiveness of 
oversight systems, which is protected by the business judgment rule.161 
An oversight failure is “conscious disregard” of the oversight duty; 
namely, a failure to act in good faith in violation of a known duty to 
act.162 Directors fail to satisfy the oversight duty when they (1) 
“completely fail to implement any reporting or information system or 
controls,” or (2) “having implemented such a system or controls, 
consciously fail to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling 
themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their 
attention.”163 Courts treat such conscious disregard as “bad faith.” It 
concerns “conduct that is qualitatively different from, and more culpable 
than, the conduct giving rise to a violation of the fiduciary duty of care 
(i.e., gross negligence).”164 Bad faith may be inferred from evidence (1) 
suggesting that the board of directors made no effort to implement an 
oversight system,165 (2) showing disregard of information about 
problems that ought to be addressed,166 or (3) indicating that the 
company had no reporting protocols.167 This legal notion of failure 
heavily rests on the bedrock principle of fiduciary duties—the business 
judgment rule. Courts are willing to review the good faith or rationality 
of the decision-making processes, but not the content of business 
decisions.168 
In Marchand v. Barnhill (2019), the Delaware Supreme Court 
refined the oversight duty. Under Marchand, companies must tailor their 
governance, risk management, and compliance functions to address 
“central compliance risks,” as well as “yellow and red flags” about 
 
 159. See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 823; Stone, 911 A.2d at 368, 371-73, Caremark, 698 
A.2d at 970-71. 
 160. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 823. 
 161. Id. at 821. 
 162. See, e.g., Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 123-25; Stone, 911 A.2d at 369-70; In re Walt 
Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 66 (Del. 2006). 
 163. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 821. 
 164. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369. 
 165. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 822; Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971 (“an utter failure to attempt 
to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists” or “sustained or systematic 
failure of a director to exercise reasonable oversight.”). 
 166. See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 820-21, 823; see also Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. 
 167. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 822-23. 
 168. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. 
554 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:59 
matters that are “intrinsically critical to the company’s business 
operation.”169 Marchand’s requirements may be summarized as follows: 
(1) Governance. The board must make a good faith effort to 
implement and monitor “a reasonable board-level system of 
monitoring and reporting.”170 This board-level system must include 
(a) reporting protocols that keep the board informed of critical 
compliance risks, (b) a board committee (or committees) to oversee 
critical compliance issues, (c) a “full board-level process” to address 
critical compliance risks, and (d) documentation of the board-level 
oversight processes that goes beyond references to discussions of 
operational issues.171 
(2) Risk Management. The company’s risk management function 
should have policies intending to identify, detect, and analyze 
hazards concerning the critical issues.172 
(3) Compliance. The company’s compliance function should include 
policies intending to identify, implement, and monitor preventative 
controls to limit risks, as well as reporting protocols.173 The 
“[a]ppropriate corporate officials must monitor these preventative 
controls.”174 Importantly, compliance systems largely operate at the 
interiors of organizations. Therefore, reporting procedures that 
inform the board of performance and risks are necessary. 
This judicial interpretation of the oversight duty is still 
underdeveloped. For example, it is unclear what compliance risks are 
“central,” “essential,” or “mission critical” to an organization.  
Citing Caremark, courts regularly emphasize that an oversight 
failure claim is “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law 
upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”175 Even so, today 
D&O face an increased risk of liability. Technological advancements of 
the digital era have considerably improved and will continue to improve 
the ability to monitor compliance with applicable laws. Over time, it will 
become difficult to argue that the exercise of good faith judgment could 
result in the implementation of ineffective information and reporting 
systems. In other words, the technology of information and reporting 
systems is likely to become a factor that courts will consider. 
 
 169. Id. at 823-24 (providing that a food company should calibrate its governance, risk 
management, and compliance functions to address food safety and compliance with food 
safety laws.). 
 170. Id. at 821. 
 171. Id. at 809, 813, 824. 
 172. Id. at 810. 
 173. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 810. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. 
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B. Derivative Actions: The Demand Requirement 
Companies rarely sue D&O to recover losses resulting from alleged 
antitrust violations. Judicial opinions and the literature cite Wilshire Oil 
Co. v. Riffe (1969) to illustrate circumstances in which companies may 
take such course of action.176 There, a company sued former executives 
of a newly acquired business, not officers of the company itself. For the 
common unwillingness of companies to sue D&O, derivative actions 
offer a path for investors to sue on behalf of the company. This path, 
however, requires a preliminary legal battle. When an organization 
suffers losses, any legal claims that may be used to recover the losses 
belong to the organization. The pursuit of such claims is within the 
fiduciary responsibilities of the board and management that must 
evaluate whether such action is within the interests of the organization. 
The plaintiff, thus, must show that the majority of the board is too 
conflicted to pursue such claims.177 
Procedurally, the plaintiff must make a demand on the board of 
directors to pursue the claims. Alternatively, the plaintiff can file a 
complaint, alleging that a demand is futile because the majority of the 
directors have an interest in the underlying claims, lack independence, 
or face a substantial risk of personal liability. Judicial evaluations of this 
standard are favorable to defendants. For the purpose of this paper, the 
key point is that changing attitudes toward executives may affect the 
interpretation of the demand requirement. 
C. Securities Class Actions 
The U.S. securities regulatory framework heavily rests on the 
premise that public information enhances accountability. The regulation 
of disclosures is, accordingly, a central element of this framework. A 
complex set of statutory and regulatory standards require the disclosure 
of material risks, measures taken to monitor and address material risks, 
certification of the correctness and completeness of certain types of 
information, and certification of the effectiveness of internal controls. 
Public companies must disclose material information about the 
competition they face, as well as information about material risks and 
liabilities. For example, Regulation S-K imposes affirmative obligations 
on registrants to disclose “any material pending legal proceedings,” 
“proceedings known to be contemplated by governmental authorities,” 
and “any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the 
registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable or 
 
 176. See Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1969). 
 177. See Collins J. Seitz, Jr. and S. Michael Sirkin, The Demand Review Committee: How 
It Works, and How It Could Work Better, 73 BUS. L. 305 (2018). 
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unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing 
operations.”178 Material misstatements and omissions may expose D&O, 
especially those who make statements or certify financial statements, to 
potential liabilities. 
The evolution of disclosure requirements has paralleled the 
development of the oversight duty. Today, public companies are 
expected to disclose legal risks created by government investigation and 
private lawsuits.179 Further, settlements of investigations and lawsuits 
raise the question of whether prior statements were adequate. For 
example, competition and legal risks are risk factors that public 
companies describe in their financial statements. Where an antitrust 
action claims that a company engaged in unlawful anticompetitive 
conduct, the question is whether past representations about competition 
and legal risks were adequate. In recent years, the initiation of antitrust 
actions has triggered securities class actions against companies and their 
senior executives.180 
D. Protections Against Personal Liability 
D&O enjoy broad protections against personal liability for losses 
suffered by the corporation. These protections intend to preserve risk 
taking and minimize chilling effects.181 They include the business 
judgment rule, exculpatory clauses, indemnification, advancement, and 
insurance. The business judgment rule and exculpatory clauses release 
D&O from certain liabilities, whereas indemnification, advancement, 
and insurance cover certain costs of investigations, litigation, and 
damages. The latter set of protections shift the costs of personal liability 
to the company. Companies may reduce these costs by hardening their 
oversight systems. Thus, again, courts may infer that rational D&O must 
harden oversight system to reduce the costs of certain legal risks. 
 
 178. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii). 
 179. See, e.g., Diehl v. Omega Protein Corp., 339 F. Supp. 3d 153 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); In re 
Wells Fargo & Co. Shareholder Derivative Lit., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2017); In re 
Eletrobras Sec. Litig., 245 F. Supp. 3d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); In re Sanofi Sec. Litig., 155 F. 
Supp. 3d 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); In re Gentiva Sec. Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 352 (E.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
 180. See, e.g., In re Mylan N.V. Sec. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 3d 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); Speakes 
v. Taro Pharm. Indus., Ltd., 2018 WL 4572987 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2018); Utesch v. Lannett 
Company, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d 895 (E.D. Pa. 2018); Chamberlain v. Reddy Ice Holdings, 
Inc., 757 F. Supp. 2d 683 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Menkes v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 2005 WL 3050970 
(D. Conn. Nov. 10, 2005); In re Sotheby’s Holdings, Inc., 2000 WL 1234601 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
31, 2000). 
 181. See, e.g., Hermelin v. K-V Pharm. Co., 54 A.3d 1093, 1094 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“No 
corporation can be a success unless led by competent and energetic officers and directors. 
Such individuals would be unwilling to serve if exposed to the broad range of potential 
liability and legal costs inherent in such service despite the most scrupulous regard for the 
interests of stockholders.”). 
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The business judgment rule is the principal protection and first line 
of defense. The rule is “a presumption that in making a business decision 
the directors [and officers] of a corporation acted on an informed basis, 
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the company.”182 This presumption of propriety proscribes 
judicial second guessing of business decisions. Accordingly, “the mere 
fact that a company takes on business risk and suffers losses—even 
catastrophic losses—does not evidence misconduct, and without more, 
is not a basis for personal director liability.”183 The business judgment 
rule, however, does not extend to D&O who (1) knowingly approve, 
direct, or participate in violations of law,184 or (2) consciously disregard 
their fiduciary obligations, which include the duty act in good faith to 
assure that the organization complies with applicable legal standards.185 
Exculpatory clauses are optional provisions in the certificate of 
incorporations that relieve D&O from monetary damages for breaches 
of fiduciary duties. In Delaware, exculpatory clauses cannot absolve 
D&Os of “breaches of the duty of loyalty or actions or omissions not in 
good faith or that involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation 
of law.”186 As interpreted by Delaware courts, conscious disregard of 
legal risks is an act of bad faith.187 
The Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) “requires a 
corporation to indemnify a person who was made a party to a proceeding 
by reason of his service to the corporation and has achieved success on 
the merits or otherwise in that proceeding.”188 The statute, however, 
“prohibits a corporation from indemnifying a corporate official who was 
not successful in the underlying proceeding and has acted, essentially, in 
 
 182. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (overruled on other grounds); 
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bad faith.”189 “For any circumstance between the extremes of ‘success’ 
and ‘bad faith,’ the DGCL leaves the corporation with the discretion to 
determine whether to indemnify its officer or director.”190 
Indemnification and advancement clauses are contractual arrangements 
that formalize criteria for such discretion. 
Indemnification clauses define the scope of the potential 
reimbursement of D&O for litigation costs, and potentially judgments, 
incurred in connection with claims arising out of the director’s or 
officer’s service to the company.191 Advancement clauses may require 
the corporation to cover certain costs prior to the conclusion of an 
investigation or litigation through advancements. D&O, however, may 
repay any paid advancement if “determined that [the] person is not 
entitled to be indemnified by the corporation.”192 Indemnification and 
advancement rights continue after an individual has ceased to serve the 
company, unless the governing provisions expressly state otherwise.193 
Such rights cannot be eliminated or impaired after the occurrence of the 
relevant act or omission, unless the governing provisions expressly state 
otherwise.194 
D&O liability insurance typically provides (1) protection for 
individual D&O when indemnification is not available, (2) coverage for 
the organization when it indemnifies directors and officers, and (3) 
protection for the organization itself. Such insurance policies frequently 
contain exclusions precluding coverage for criminal misconduct. The 
availability of insurance for antitrust liabilities requires companies to 
consider their commitment to compliance, as such the premia they pay 
reflects such commitments.195 
CONCLUSION 
Congress debated and passed the principal antitrust statutes—the 
Sherman, Clayton and FTC Acts, believing that personal accountability 
for antitrust violations was an effective and necessary enforcement 
mode. Nonetheless, until the 1990s, the prosecution of individuals for 
their roles in antitrust violations was relatively limited. 
The past three decades have witnessed growing pressures to 
increase scrutiny of large businesses and hold executives accountable for 
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Ch. 2016). 
 193. 8 Del. C.§ 145(j); Marino, 131 A.3d at 337. 
 194. 8 Del. C.§ 145(f). 
 195. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence 
from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 487 (2007). 
2020] D&O LIABILITY FOR ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS 559 
corporate wrongdoing. This trend led to a gradual transformation of 
liability standards and enforcement policies toward D&O oversight 
responsibilities. A complex set of interrelated factors have contributed 
to the trend: technological disruption, globalization, large-scale 
corporate fiascos, the Great Recession, soaring economic disparities, and 
the persistent expansion of corporate rights in the United States.196 These 
factors have also renewed old beliefs that antitrust law could and should 
be used to deconcentrate the economy, break up large corporations, and 
curb corporate greed. This Article explored how the changing attitudes 
toward corporate wrongdoing and antitrust law have affected the 
expectations for D&O oversight of antitrust risks. 
Until recently, the growing emphasis on personal accountability has 
mostly focused on individuals who took part in the alleged violations. In 
large and decentralized corporations, however, D&O rarely participate 
in, direct, or authorize violations of law. Instead, consciously or 
subconsciously, they incentivize violations through compensation 
schemes that are tied to profit. This pattern has further contributed to the 
perception that D&O are not held accountable for corporate misconduct. 
Recently, the DOJ and the Antitrust Division adopted guidelines 
that require federal prosecutors to evaluate the effectiveness of 
compliance programs. These guidelines are consistent with the growing 
understanding that D&O sometimes create, preserve, or neglect an 
organizational culture that motivates violations. The guidelines clarify 
that, in the modern economy, rational D&O must adopt effective 
compliance programs. In Marchand, the Delaware Supreme Court 
adopted this standard. 
This Article finds that antitrust’s personal accountability standards 
still focus on direct involvement and, as such, are relatively outdated and 
ineffective. In this context, the Antitrust Division’s guidelines for 
effective antitrust compliance program mark a critically important 
development. This Article also finds that parallel developments in 
corporate and securities laws have further reinforced the growing 
expectations for oversight of antitrust compliance and require D&O to 
meet heightened oversight responsibilities. 
To conclude, it is often said that with great power comes great 
responsibility. Recent developments in American law follow this rule of 
thumb. There are good reasons to hold D&O accountable for failures to 
develop and maintain corporate culture of compliance with applicable 
laws and regulations, including antitrust law.  
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